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The challenges of nation building in Melanesia and Timor-Leste have
often been neglected in the regional focus on state-building challenges.
High levels of ethno-linguistic diversity, combined with an array of
regional, historical and cultural divisions, continue to present obstacles
to the creation of a cohesive sense of national political community
leading these nations to be labelled ‘fragile’. This paper presents the
findings of a comparative study on the attitudes of tertiary students in
Melanesia and Timor-Leste to national identity and nation building. A
strong pan-Melanesian pattern of group identification was identified,
common to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. The
ongoing importance of traditional authority and custom in informing
conceptions of political community and identity was evident in all four
case study sites, but was in each case matched by indicators of respect
for modern state authority. The survey also reveals some significant
gender differences in key attitudes towards national identity, including
the role of traditional authorities. Most importantly, the study reveals
high degrees of national pride, and faith in democratic principles and
citizenship; but conversely, low levels of pride in contemporary
democratic performance and inter-group tolerance.
Keywords: national identity; nation-building; Papua New Guinea;
Solomon Islands; Vanuatu; Timor-Leste
Introduction
The challenges of nation-building in Melanesia and Timor-Leste have often
been neglected in the focus on state-building agendas. While these
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communities have shown significant social resilience in the face of external and
internal pressures, high levels of ethno-linguistic diversity, combined with an
array of regional, historical and cultural divisions, continue to present obstacles
to the creation of a cohesive sense of national political community. One of the
most profound obstacles, most agree, is the disjuncture between Westminster
(or other European derived) government systems, and traditional collective
societies in which localised obligations to extended family and traditional auth-
ority frequently supersede allegiances to the nation-state. Perceptions of poor or
even declining state effectiveness in this region have been reinforced by politi-
cal crises and civil conflicts in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste, prompting
discussion of ‘fragile states’ by formal agencies of regional powers such as
Australia (e.g. AusAID, 2006). While there is a wealth of literature on the
sources of state failure, comparatively little is written on the views of this
region’s citizens themselves: how they view the state, the nation and their
own place within these entities.
This paper presents the findings of an 18-month research project on the atti-
tudes of tertiary students in Melanesia and Timor-Leste to national identity and
key issues of nation-building. The research was conducted at tertiary campuses
across four sites: Dili, Port Vila, Honiara and Port Moresby. The study exam-
ined the attitudes of the young educated elite likely to dominate the next gen-
eration of leaders and decision makers. Their views are pivotal to
understanding the challenges to building a more cohesive sense of national
identity and political community in Melanesia and Timor-Leste. Findings high-
light the ongoing importance of family, religion and maintaining traditional
customs in student conceptions of political community. Depending on the
case study, they also illustrate the importance of geographical region of
origin, language orientation, and gender in explaining differences in key atti-
tudes towards national identity. This article presents a comparative analysis
of those findings across the four target sites.
In general, it is argued that the Melanesian countries show a relatively high
degree of similarity in responses, with key differences attributable to particular
historical, regional or linguistic legacies of colonial rule. A strong pan-Melane-
sian pattern of group identification was identified, common to Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. The ongoing importance of traditional
authority and custom in conceptions of political community and identity was
evident in all four case study sites, but was in each case matched by indicators
of respect for modern state authority. Most importantly, this study reveals high
degrees of national pride, and faith in democratic principles and citizenship;
conversely, however, it reveals low levels of pride in contemporary democratic
performance and inter-group tolerance. While tertiary students demonstrate
relatively strong attachments to the nation, and in-principle civic nationalist
commitments to the state (including citizenship and respect for law and
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political institutions), concerns over the capacity of centralised authority to
provide basic services appear to undermine positive perceptions of the state
in practice. Counter-intuitively, pride in democracy and inter-group tolerance
was higher in post-conflict societies (Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste) than
in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.
Background: nation- and state-building
Though the term has a long and diverse history (see, e.g. Berger, 2006; Rae,
2002),1 nation-building is employed here to refer to the cultural processes of
forming a cohesive political community to support the development of a func-
tional state. While the international community is preoccupied with post-con-
flict state-building (focused on improving governance, institutional capacity,
accountability, and the rule of law) the broader processes of nation-building
(community development, identity formation, and national integration), and
of creating the conditions for social cohesion and political stability have
been relatively neglected. Most international assistance undertaken under the
auspices of ‘nation-building’ has in fact been directed at state-building (Chand-
ler, 2006), and the two categories are regularly conflated in the literature. Yet
the challenges facing fragile or emerging states in the south-west Pacific
derive from both a lack of a functional state and the absence of a functional
‘national’ political community, based on a broadly legitimate and unifying
sense of national identity.
For Borgerhoff (2006, p. 103), nation-building is the ‘deliberate interest-
and ideology-based formation of a national format which creates collective
identity and affiliation of the population within the nation-state’. As Dinnen
(2007, p. 3) argues, these conscious attempts to develop ‘a shared sense of iden-
tity and community’ among various populations within a state do not necess-
arily have to foster homogeneity, but must at least produce a sustainable
consensus on shared civic goals, and tolerance of heterogeneity. In the
context of weak and uneven economic development, however, latent social div-
isions may be compounded in the competition for scarce resources, producing
forms of national politics characterised by inter-group contests for the capture
of the state, to benefit regional or clan-based patronage networks. Strong
regional divisions in south-west Pacific states, with attendant problems of pol-
itical stability in the region, attest to the ongoing challenges of nation-building
for postcolonial political elites.
There are also particular challenges of nation- and state-building in ‘new
subsistence states’ (Nixon, 2006) characterised by low levels of economic
development, and subsistence agriculture as a predominant mode of economic
activity outside cities. As Nixon argues, where a substantial proportion of the
national population is reliant on subsistence farming, integration into
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‘modern’ economic and political systems regulated by the nation-state may be
minimal. Such environments are normally characterised by the ongoing pres-
ence of ‘local administrative mechanisms capable of operating independently
from the state in accordance with the principles of “traditional authority”’
(Nixon, 2006, p. 75), and the postcolonial ‘imposition’ of a modern state
model, rather than its independent development in situ.
Effective nation formation is therefore not just about the lateral integration
of different groups around ‘deliberate’ constructions of nation-building goals,
interests and political values, but also about the way prevailing socioeconomic
structures influence the formation or reproduction of political communities;
how tensions between modern and traditional conceptions of authority influ-
ence popular conceptions of state legitimacy; how nation-building and state-
building agendas interact; and how these processes combine, successfully or
otherwise, to create ‘national’ constituencies in support of the state and its insti-
tutions. In particular, the sustainability of relationships between influential con-
ceptions of traditional community and modern state institutions are central to
the contemporary studies of nation-building (Dinnen, 2007), along with the
potential for ‘hybrid’ forms of political authority to promote stability
(Brown, 2007).
Nation-building in Melanesia and Timor-Leste
Like most south-west Pacific societies, the four nations in this study (Papua
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Timor-Leste) can be characterised
as predominantly rural societies, with subsistence agriculture the dominant
form of economic production outside urban areas. While geographic and his-
torical factors have produced more ethnic fragmentation and variety in some
countries (especially Papua New Guinea), all four countries could be described
as segmentary societies characterised by multiple ethno-linguistic groups –
with over 1000 distinct languages between them. While there is a history of
cyclical and permanent rural–urban migration in each of these societies,
land, language and clan are tightly bound together and constitute the most
essential markers of social and cultural identity. Systems of exchange relation-
ships within these family networks (better known as wantoks in Papua New
Guinea and Solomon Islands) have primacy over obligations to more recent
institutions such as the state.
The continued strength of traditional beliefs, languages and the primacy of
family networks can be viewed in a positive light, demonstrating strong social
capital (De Renzio, 2000) within local groups. Nonetheless, these four nations
face a range of contemporary problems, many of which stem from the impo-
sition of a Westminster-style centralised state by outgoing colonial govern-
ments (or in the case of Timor-Leste, by Indonesia and then the UN) onto
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these highly heterogeneous and traditional polities, and consequent tensions
between traditional and modern forms of authority.
Aside from tensions between traditional and modern forms of governance,
historical, colonial and missionary influences have produced a range of con-
temporary social and political cleavages which, in the immediate post-indepen-
dent period at least, have been reflected in regional voting patterns, party
preferences and also lines of conflict. In Timor-Leste, for example, the 2006
conflict cleaved along east–west regional lines, driven by conflict within and
between security forces, with the subsequent election resulting in strongly
regionalised voting blocs, with the FRETILIN Party drawing its support predo-
minantly from the east and the parties forming the new Parliamentary Majority
Alliance government predominantly drawing their support from the western
districts (Leach, 2009). In Vanuatu, where the denomination of missionaries
determined language of education, zones of Anglophone or Francophone mis-
sionary influence produced additional religious, geographic and political sym-
metries, for at least a decade after independence. While the symmetry between
language of education and political party allegiances has become increasingly
blurred in Vanuatu, this linguistic cleavage has continued to prove a salient
influence on national identity.
These same influences have also produced strong regional identities and
often secessionist tendencies. In Papua New Guinea, the secessionist sentiment
that emerged at independence resulted in a protracted and destabilising seces-
sionist war in Bougainville and has endured in other regions such as in East
New Britain (Hawksley, 2006). Tensions have also mounted in West New
Britain and Popondetta, Oro Province due to internal migration policies and
conflict over land (Koczberski & Curry, 2004). In Solomon Islands, early mis-
sionary activity, combined with historical inter-island trading links, produced a
strong western islands regional identity, and a movement which also threatened
secession at independence (Bennett, 2002).2
The legacy of colonial languages (a dual legacy in the case of Timor-Leste
and Vanuatu) has also created significant barriers to the development of
national identity. The adoption of a single national indigenous language has
had varying fortunes in each country. Language policy has also been highly
contested in these countries, most notably in Timor-Leste, where the adoption
of Portuguese as an official language (alongside Tetun-Dili), in a country where
the bulk of the population were educated in Indonesian, has been highly
controversial.
Christianity figures prominently in the daily lives of the citizens of these
countries, with churches of various denominations playing a central role in
service provision, especially in health and education, but also in conflict resol-
ution and social cohesion. As with political systems, Christianity has become
‘indigenised’ to some extent. In all four countries Christianity coexists with
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 451
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traditional belief systems exemplified by Kastom (or Adat in Timor-Leste), with
people able to maintain both belief systems in tandem, often with syncretic fea-
tures. According to Douglas (2000), it has become a central motif in the rheto-
ric of Melanesian nation makers, who have sought to transcend diverse cultures
and divisions by linking custom with Christianity as unifying, universal belief
systems.
Rural–urban migration has also been a major feature of these four societies,
and a considerable source of social tension. In colonial times, there was tight
control over in-migration to towns, which were largely reserved for the colonial
and commercial elites (Koczberski, Curry, & Connell, 2001; Ranck, 1977).
This pattern changed dramatically with independence. According to Haberkorn
(1992), Melanesia’s urban population tripled from a mere 7 per cent of the
region’s total population in 1955 to 20 per cent by 1985, which he attributes
to rural–urban migration. At current rates, he claims (Haberkorn, 2008)
urban populations in Melanesia are set to double in the next 25 years. In
Papua New Guinea, much of the recent urban migrant population has
become concentrated in peri-urban fringe settlements, which have become a
source of crime and sometimes social friction (Guthrie, Hukula, & Laki,
2005a, 2005b). In Timor-Leste, almost half of Dili’s population is composed
of internal migrants, and most of this inward migration is recent (Neupert
and Lopes, 2006). Competition over land, employment and other scarce
resources between migrant groups and original inhabitants, and resentment
towards ‘newcomers’ has produced conflict in all four nations, most notably
in Timor-Leste during the 2006–2007 crisis, and in the 1998–2003
Solomon Islands conflict3 between Guadalcanal islanders and Malaitan immi-
grants, resident in large numbers in Honiara since the 1950s. In Vanuatu,
resentment of migrants from Tanna Island has also resulted in social tensions,
which boiled over into conflict in 2007.
The societies of Melanesia and Timor-Leste are also characterised by a
‘youth bulge’,4 with large proportions of the national populations under 25
years of age,5 and high fertility rates (compared to the rest of the Pacific), com-
bined with low levels of youth employment in formal sectors. Tertiary student
therefore represent the most educated section of a highly significant demo-
graphic in these societies. These demographic features are associated with
the increasing likelihood of civil conflict, and specifically in relation to large
male youth population combined with high levels of unemployment, increased
rates of crimes and gang activity.
Conflict has dogged the post-independence era for these countries, most
recently in Timor-Leste in 2006–2007, Solomon Islands from 1998 to 2003
and in 2006, Vanuatu in 2007, but most enduringly in Papua New Guinea’s
decade-long Bougainville crisis. Ongoing but small-scale conflict still blights
the Southern Highlands region of Papua New Guinea6 (Capie, 2011) and
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some recently resettled urban areas of Dili in Timor-Leste, contested by
distinct family and language groups (Scambary, 2011). While Solomon
Islands and Vanuatu are currently enjoying a prolonged period of relative
peace and stability, both have suffered recent violence and are still considered
fragile states.
The impact of these divisions on governance in these four countries has
been salutary. Each country has suffered numerous crises of governance,
with declining economic performance, levels of service delivery and a conse-
quent decline in popular legitimacy. Adding further to this has been the emer-
gence of an elite political class in what were formerly more egalitarian
societies, with the capacity to purchase voter allegiance to access state
resources. This decline in legitimacy has sometimes been reflected in voter
turnout (Morgan, 2008). Apart from violent political crises, the post-indepen-
dence polities of these four nations have been subject to a progressive fragmen-
tation, as political systems have increasingly come to reflect the traditional
clan-based nature of these societies. This has produced unstable coalition gov-
ernments based around personalities or blocs with regional power bases, often
with few discernible policies other than competition for access to state
resources.
As Douglas (2000) argues, the state’s ineffective service provision and
failure to equitably distribute state resources such as employment and devel-
opment opportunities across all sectors of society, particularly rural regions,
has revitalised traditional networks such as families and clans as alternative
means of access to resources (see also Ketan, 2004). The inability of the
state to provide services outside urban areas, has contributed strongly to a
widening gap between perceptions of the state and nation in Melanesia
and Timor-Leste. The state’s declining reach and influence in regional
areas has sharpened regional divisions and identities, thereby reinvigorating
dormant secessionist tendencies. For this reason, Scott (2005) contends that
the weakness of the state is a cause, rather than an effect, of the compara-
tive weakness of national identity. As this study’s findings suggest, many of
these historical and contemporary divisions remain key markers of identity
that give rise to often starkly contrasting attitudes to nation and national
identity.
Methodology
This paper utilises a unique data-set based on tertiary student survey responses.
Surveys were conducted from June 2009 to March 2010 on the campuses of
University of the South Pacific (USP) Honiara, the University of Papua New
Guinea (UPNG) in Port Moresby, at three campuses in Dili (National
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University of Timor Lorosa’e (UNTL), The University of Peace UNPAZ and
Dili Institute of Technology) and in Port Vila (USP Vanuatu, Vanuatu Institute
of Teacher Education and the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie). The
survey tool uses core questions from the International Social Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) module on national identity (with permission), modified for
use in local contexts, in combination with additional questions reflecting the
local conditions, customs and geographies of these four nations. Surveys
were conducted in the language of instruction of each campus: English at
UPNG and USP Honiara; English and French in Vanuatu; and in Timor-
Leste, in Bahasa Indonesia, the written language most easily understood. All
respondents (n ¼ 1161)7 were tertiary students aged 18 years or older, and
were surveyed anonymously.
Questions fell into three broad categories: those addressing the respon-
dents’ gender, age, province of origin and self-identified language proficien-
cies; the (modified) core questions from the ISSP examining attitudes
towards the relative importance of particular indicators of national identity,
strength of affiliations to different levels of political community, and national
pride and group loyalty indicators; and third, a set of additional questions
addressing preferences for agents of dispute resolution in differing circum-
stances. Among other things, these indicators allow the researcher to assess
relative degrees of affiliation to traditional and modern political communities,
and to local, sub-national or national communities. Survey responses were
further analysed to examine any statistically significant associations with
gender, region of origin or language proficiency.
Before outlining findings, it must be emphasised that these survey groups
cannot be considered representative of Melanesian and East Timorese
‘youth’ attitudes per se. Rather, this particular study is a deliberate sample
of tertiary students, which seeks to gauge the attitudes of an educated
stratum of youth, and one likely to feature strongly in future political, econ-
omic and technocratic elites. Nonetheless, as tertiary institutions tend to be
centralised in the capital cities, and students travel from all over the
country to study, the samples are broadly representative of regions and dis-
tricts within the case study countries. Importantly, where national sentiment
tends to be most prominent in these four states, it is generally considered to
be strongest in urban enclaves, which are typically more ethnically hetero-
geneous, and further removed from traditional communities and authorities
in the regions. For this reason, tertiary students living and studying in the
national capitals represent an important test case: they are more likely
than the general population to represent an ‘advance guard’ of these
‘national’ identities and, equally, to exhibit a higher degree of integration
into the political, economic (and formal educational-linguistic) life of the
nation-state.
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Survey findings
Self-identified language proficiencies
Figure 1 details the self-identified language proficiencies of the respondents in
official or national languages. The survey responses unsurprisingly indicate
stronger proficiency in the national lingua franca of the four countries (Tok
Pisin,8 Solomons Pijin, Bislama and Tetum-Dili), compared with the European
official languages (English, French and Portuguese). Notable among the find-
ings were low levels of English language proficiency among Solomon Islander
students, with rankings reflecting the interruption of schooling and of the edu-
cation system during the crisis period, and the relative weakness of student pro-
ficiency in the recently reintroduced co-official language of Portuguese in
Timor-Leste, where a key language of written literacy remains Indonesian. It
is important to emphasise that these are subjective indicators, testing only
respondents’ self-perceptions of fluency.
Responses to political community questions
A series of questions were asked to assess the relative depth of respondents’
affiliations to their various sub-national, national and supranational commu-
nities. Specific categories differed for each country to reflect distinct geo-
graphic and administrative communities such as settlements, villages,
islands, districts, and also supranational regions such as Melanesia, the
Pacific, or South East Asia. The survey asked respondents to identify how
close or ‘emotionally attached’ they feel to each.
Overall, each of the four samples indicated the relative strength of village
and national affiliations for tertiary students, with considerably lower levels
of affiliation reported for intervening sub-national categories (see Table 1).
This finding reinforces the ongoing importance of kinship systems and inter-
linked land ownership in these societies as a primary marker of identity, and
reflects the purely administrative value of intermediary entities, many of
which, such as provinces and districts, are colonial inventions which resonate
less profoundly with citizens. It also reflects the relative strength of national
affiliations among tertiary students.
In focus group discussions, students put the view that they had developed a
stronger sense of the nation after moving away from their own regions and
customs, living in the capital city, and mixing with peers from other areas of
the country. Urban living, and the pan-ethnic cultures it created were con-
sidered a key reinforcer of national culture and sentiment. For the participants,
the sharing of customs amongst students promoted a greater sense of national
identity, where mixing with peers from one’s own village tended to strengthen
local and sub-national affiliations. This presents a self-perception of tertiary
students as a group with more opportunities to develop a greater level of
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‘national’ sentiment, and, accordingly, more capable of transcending local
bonds and affiliations. Notably, the two countries with the stronger histories
of anti-colonial nationalism and consciousness raising, Vanuatu and Timor-
Leste, had the greater disparities between national and village affiliations, in
favour of closeness to nation, while the strengths of these twin affiliations
were closely parallel in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.
Figure 1. Self-identified official language proficiencies: tertiary students.
Table 1. ‘How close or emotionally attached do you feel to your ...’ (percentage of
respondents answering ‘very close’ or ‘close’).
Village/
neighbourhood
Sub-
district/
island
Province/
district Nation Melanesia Pacific
Southeast
Asia
PNG 87.5 77.5 81.5 89.5 68.5 55.5 na
Solomon
Islands
81 73 71 82.5 66.5 51.5 na
Vanuatu 84.5 83.5 78 91.5 73.5 66.5 na
Timor-
Leste
79.5 63 62.5 92.5 20 na 52
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Supranational affiliations among tertiary students were, unsurprisingly, uni-
formly lower again than sub-national affiliations, Nonetheless, the relative
strength of pan-Melanesian identification among Papua New Guinean,
Solomon Islander and Ni-Vanuatu students was evident, with feelings of close-
ness to Melanesia significantly exceeding feelings of closeness towards ‘the
Pacific’ region in general. For its part, the Timor-Leste survey clearly demon-
strates the relative strength of Southeast Asian affiliation (52 per cent) among
East Timorese tertiary students relative to any affinity they feel to the Melanesian
societies further east (20 per cent). This is an instructive finding that casts light on
tertiary student perceptions of the view, more frequently expressed before inde-
pendence, that Timor-Leste may be seen as a ‘crossroads’ society, linking South-
east Asia with the Pacific-Melanesian region (e.g. Ramos-Horta, 1996).
Regional, linguistic and gender differences
Notably, however, when these responses are examined by region of origin,
language of education, or gender, some distinct differences emerged. In
Papua New Guinea, for example, region of origin was a strong predictor of
reported levels of closeness to Papua New Guinea. In Papua New Guinea,
there are four distinct regions (Papua, Momase, Highlands and the Islands), dif-
ferentiated by their colonial histories, natural resource endowments and ethnic
groups.9 Where an average 92.5 per cent of respondents from the three regions
of Papua, Momase and the Highlands reported feeling ‘very close’ or ‘close’ to
Papua New Guinea, this figure dropped substantially for respondents from the
Islands region (80 per cent ‘very close’ or ‘close’).10 As well as bearing out
well known separatist trends in parts of the Islands region, this finding
perhaps reaffirms Hawksley’s (2006) claim that acceptance of the nation-
state in Papua New Guinea is heavily influenced by length of exposure to Euro-
pean rule, with the most fractious regions such as the Islands having the longest
exposure, and the Highlands having the least.
In the Solomon Islands survey, Malaitan students were significantly more
likely to express feelings of closeness to Solomon Islands (88 per cent ‘very
close’ or ‘close’) than were non-Malaitan students (75.5 per cent). These find-
ings suggest that Malaitan students living in the capital are relatively more
likely to adopt a nationally oriented identity and perspective, while other
groups are relatively more disposed to sub-national identifications. For
example, non-Malaitan students expressed higher degrees of closeness to
their home island (76.5 per cent) than did Malaitan students (70 per cent).
These differences were much starker in relation to feeling ‘very close’ to
their home island (50.5 vs. 33 per cent). These findings are likely to reflect
varying feelings of ‘ownership’ or belonging of the separate levels of political
community.
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In Vanuatu, Anglophone students reported feeling significantly closer to the
Melanesian region (81 per cent) than did Francophone (59 per cent) students –
a finding which likely reflects the dominance of English in Melanesian societies
other than New Caledonia and, of course, the historical origin of ideas of pan-
Melanesian unity in the former British colonies (and Australian territories). It is
likewise notable that where closeness to Melanesia exceeded closeness to the
Pacific (71.5 per cent) among Anglophones, Francophone responses to the
Pacific (55.5 per cent) were broadly similar, suggesting the relative weakness
of any distinctive conception of pan-Melanesian identity among French
speakers. Even so, Ni-Vanuatu students as a group still showed the highest
levels of affiliation to the Melanesian region of any case study country,
indicating that the notion of a pan-Melanesian identity (and solidarity, of which
several of Vanuatu’s post-independence leaders have been vocal champions,
and hosts of the Melanesian Spearhead Group headquarters) has considerable res-
onance for Ni-Vanuatu students – and among Anglophones in particular.
In the case of Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, gender was also a
predictor of ‘closeness to village’, with 90 per cent of male respondents from
Papua New Guinea feeling very close or close to their village, compared
with 83 per cent for women. This disparity was somewhat starker again in
Solomon Islands (men 84.5 per cent, women 72 per cent), and is likely to
reflect young women’s attitudes to male domination of traditional authority
structures, and women’s lack of voice in decision-making at village level11
(Pollard, 2000; Wallace, 2000). One of the women in the Papua New Guinea
focus group remarked that in her village women are forbidden to speak at
public gatherings, which she felt was a situation experienced by women in
many other parts of Papua New Guinea (Focus Group, 2009). These findings
were further reinforced in gendered preferences for agents of dispute resolution,
discussed further below.
Attitudes towards national identity
The survey then asked respondents about the importance of certain attributes of
membership of their respective national community. Respondents rated their
responses to these questions as ‘very important’/‘fairly important’/‘not very
important’/‘not at all important’. The national identity module consists of the
following nine questions.
Some people say the following things are important for being truly (Papua New
Guinean/Solomon Islander/Ni-Vanuatu/East Timorese). Others say they are not
important. How important do you think each of the following is?
a. To have been born in _PNG/SI/VAN/TL?
b. To have __ PNG/SI/VAN/TL __ citizenship?
c. To have lived in PNG/SI/VAN/TL for most of one’s life?
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d. To be able to speak [official language a]?
e. To be able to speak [official language b]?
f. To be a Christian?
g. To respect tradition and custom/adat?
h. To respect PNG/SI/VAN/TL political institutions and laws?
i. To feel Papua New Guinean/Solomon Islander/Ni-Vanuatu/East Timorese?
The findings illustrate considerable parallels across the four countries and a
high degree of support for several of the indicators as measures of national
belonging. However, significantly lower values were reported for the impor-
tance of ‘having lived in’ the home country all one’s life, and (with the
notable exception of Tetum-Dili in Timor-Leste) for the perceived importance
of being able to speak official and national languages (see Figure 2).
Three features of the data may be highlighted. In each of the four countries,find-
ings revealed the comparable strength of importance of ‘modern’ indicators – such
as ‘respect for political institutions and law’, and ‘being a citizen’ – and more ‘tra-
ditional’ notions of political community, such as respect for kastom or adat. With
the exception of Papua New Guinea (where ‘feeling Papua New Guinean’ received
the highest rating) these three markers received the highest scores from tertiary
Figure 2. Importance of official language ability to being ‘Truly...’.
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student respondents, with a close parity between the perceived importance of these
modern and traditional indicators in all four respondent groups (see Table 2). This is
an instructive finding, revealing the way tertiary student understandings of political
community combine high levels of respect for traditional conceptions of authority
with very strong support for modern ‘civic’ understandings of national identity.
This theme highlighting the balance between modernity and custom is reinforced
by students’ preferences for agents of dispute resolution, discussed below.
Secondly, the findings here confirm the importance of Christianity to national
identity, variously reflecting the long history of missionary activity, the
contribution of churches to fostering national sentiment,12 and their
important role in service delivery. In such vital areas as health and education,
churches provide between 30 and 50 per cent of services in the four countries
surveyed.
Nonetheless, it is notable that with the exception of Solomon Islands,
‘respect for custom’ exceeded the importance of ‘being Christian’ as a ‘very
important’ measure of national identity by small but significant margins in
each country. As one focus group participant said, while Christianity is impor-
tant, it is popularly taken to reinforce traditional belief systems, rather than
necessarily supplanting them, ‘Christianity is like a string that is tying all
that, you love your brother like you love yourself, just like the wantok
system’ (Focus Group, 2009). The continuing strength of traditional beliefs
and the primacy of kinship networks can be viewed in a positive light, as an
important source of ‘resilience’ in times of crisis (Brown, 2007), reinforced
by the ongoing dominance of subsistence economies with a high degree of
autonomy in rural areas. On the other hand, where diverse local cultures are
unable to be incorporated within a national framework, in both ideological
and political/administrative realms, the ongoing strength of kin and traditional
loyalties militates against the development of national cohesion and develop-
ment outcomes (e.g. Reilly & Phillpot, 2002).
Importance of official language abilities
The third feature of this data-set relates to the perceived importance of ability to
speak official languages (Figure 2). It is notable firstly that tertiary students
rated the ability to speak official languages as comparatively less important
indicators of membership of these national communities (though Tetum-Dili
in Timor-Leste is a clear exception). This finding is likely to reflect the linguis-
tic diversity of these societies, the historical imposition of the European
languages, and perhaps, residual perceptions of the Pidgin lingua francas of
Melanesia as relatively low status languages. For example, respondents in
the three Melanesian countries rated ‘being able to speak English’ as of
greater importance to national identity than being able to speak Tok Pisin,
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Solomon’s Pijin or Bislama, despite all cohorts reporting greater proficiency in
the latter. This finding indicates the position of English as the status language of
formal tertiary education, and may be particular to the specific group (tertiary
students) surveyed in this study.
By contrast, in Timor-Leste, ability in the co-official and national language
of Tetum-Dili was considered be of very great importance to national identity,
far outranking the perceived importance of Portuguese language ability. Even
so, and despite the well-known controversy over Portuguese in Timor-Leste,
and the evident disparity with Tetum-Dili, the perceived importance of speak-
ing Portuguese in Timor-Leste (and to a lesser extent French in Vanuatu, and
even English in Solomon Islands) rated considerably higher than actual rates
of fluency, indicating respect among non-fluent speakers for the recognition
of the language in official (constitutional) conceptions of national identity
and, potentially, the importance of these languages in securing certain jobs in
government administration.
With three official languages (including two European languages of edu-
cation), Vanuatu presented a special case in this regard. While 54.5 per cent
of Ni-Vanuatu students rated the ability to speak Bislama as ‘very important’
to being ‘truly’ Ni-Vanuatu, cross-tabulation by language of education
revealed a considerable gap between Anglophone (60 per cent ‘very impor-
tant’) and Francophone (42.3 per cent ‘very important’) assessments. Impor-
tantly, however, this did not reveal any particular Francophone indifference to
Bislama. Rather, Francophones were less likely to regard any language orien-
tation as an important feature of national identity, with quite consistent
responses across all three official languages. This contrasted markedly with
Anglophone responses, who broadly regarded official language ability as a
more important feature of being Ni-Vanuatu. Indeed, this distinction was
so pronounced that Anglophone respondents rated ‘speaking French’ as
slightly more important overall to ‘being truly Ni-Vanuatu’ than did Franco-
phones themselves. This suggests that the politicisation of these issues has
resulted in Francophones de-emphasising language issues generally in the
vocabulary of national sentiment. By contrast, Anglophone respondents
ranked capacity in each of the three languages more highly, with the greatest
gap, unsurprisingly, in relation to the ability to speak English, which two-
thirds of Anglophones ranked as being very important to being ‘truly
Ni-Vanuatu’ – 20 per cent more than did Francophone respondents (45
per cent).
Group identity
Respondents were asked to rank the top three groups they identified most
strongly with. Table 3 rank orders the first preference responses, designated
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‘most important’ by the respondents. It is notable that the rank order of all the
responses to this question were exactly replicated in Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, suggesting a strongly consistent pan-Melanesian
pattern of identification. The table demonstrates the importance, in order, of
family, religion and then occupation to tertiary students in each of these
three countries. Timor-Leste showed a variant pattern, with occupation the
key identity marker, followed by the family and then religion. Interestingly,
‘ethnic/language group’ ranked slightly higher than ‘nationalist’ in the four
countries, while Timor-Leste received the only notable response for ‘region
of the country you live in’: a finding likely to be a remnant of the politicisation
of regional identity in the political-military crisis of 2006. In Vanuatu, signifi-
cant differences were again evident between Anglophone and Francophone
respondents; with the latter showing a distinct ranked preference of Family
(36 per cent), Occupation (17 per cent), followed by Ethnic/language group
(16 per cent). The relatively higher ranking of ethnic/language group among
Francophones is an instructive finding and one likely to reflect the greater con-
sciousness of language group identity, characteristic of many national min-
orities. Interestingly, the category of ‘nationalist’ performed more strongly
among Francophones (12.5 per cent), while religion was ranked much lower
than for Anglophones, in fifth place (11.5 per cent).
National pride indicators
A further set of survey questions asked respondents about their level of national
pride in relation to various aspects of each country’s politics, history and
culture. Responses are detailed in Table 4. In each case study country, the
two categories which drew the more equivocal responses were pride in ‘the
way democracy works’, and pride in ‘the fair and equal treatment of all
Table 3. We are all part of different groups, but some are more important than others to
us. Which do you rate as the most important? (Ranked % of first preferences).
Group PNG Solomon Islands Vanuatu Timor-Leste
Family 57.0 33.3 44.7 22.5
Religion 18.1 19.9 23.5 11.6
Occupation 11.6 14.0 13.7 36.7
Ethnic/language group 5.1 11.3 6.8 7.8
Nationalist 3.8 10.8 6.5 9.5
Gender 2.1 5.9 2.4 4.0
Region of the country you live in 1.0 3.2 1.4 6.4
Age 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.9
Preferred political party 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.6
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groups in society’. By contrast, pride in national history, and pride in the
nation’s distinctive culture featured very strongly across the four cohorts.
This indicates that the key strengths of contemporary Melanesian and East
Timorese nationalism lie less in the capacity of the state, and more in wider
popular affiliations to society, culture, and independence. Certainly, the find-
ings support the focus of Melanesian nation-builders on national culture as a
unifying theme of post-independence nationalism, and help explain the empha-
sis of political elites on related concepts such as the ‘Papua New Guinean way’
or the ‘Melanesian way’.
Nonetheless, while the findings at Table 2 show high levels of respect for
political institutions and the law in principle, these figures demonstrate a rela-
tive lack of faith in contemporary democratic performance in practice, and in
the formal state’s capacity to ensure the equal treatment of all groups, in all
four countries. This was most notable in Papua New Guinea. Strikingly, just
half of the respondents were ‘very proud’ or ‘proud’ of ‘the way democracy
works’, with even fewer reporting pride in Papua New Guinea’s ‘fair and
equal treatment of all groups in society’. This stands in contrast to Timor-
Leste, which experienced a major civil conflict and political crisis in 2006,
with 79.5 per cent ‘very proud’ or ‘proud’; and 68 per cent in Solomon
Islands, which also suffered a major civil conflict and – in Honiara at least
– an almost complete breakdown of law and order from 1999 to 2003, and
major urban riots in 2006. While it is tempting to speculate as to whether the
international and regional state-building missions in Timor-Leste and
Solomon Islands have contributed to a relatively greater sense of pride in
Table 4. How proud are you of PNG/Solomon Island/Vanuatu/Timor-Leste in each of
the following? (% of respondents).
PNG
Solomon
Islands Vanuatu Timor-Leste
Very
proud
Total
proud
Very
proud
Total
proud
Very
proud
Total
proud
Very
proud
Total
proud
The way
democracy
works
22.5 51 39 68 30.5 63 45.5 79.5
Its distinctive
culture
82.0 95.5 70.5 90.5 63.5 91.5 67 96
Its history 61.5 92.5 73.5 93.5 69.0 92.5 80 97.5
Fair and equal
treatment of
all groups in
society
21 44 43 72.5 40.5 70.5 48.5 76.5
464 M. Leach et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [2
20
.2
37
.1
01
.5
0]
 a
t 2
3:
25
 2
4 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
3 
‘the way democracy works’ in these two countries, previous studies in Timor-
Leste (Leach, 2003, 2008) suggest that this particular figure merely represents a
recovery to the levels enjoyed shortly after independence in 2002 (‘very proud’
51 per cent, total 79 per cent), which had dropped significantly in the 2007
study (‘very proud’ 36 per cent, total 69 per cent) following the 2006 crisis
(Figure 3).
Regional, linguistic and gender breakdowns produced some notable find-
ings, indicative of the history of uneven resource distribution and service deliv-
ery in these four countries, along with ongoing ethno-linguistic schisms, and
civil conflict. In Papua New Guinea, respondents from the Papua region
were far less proud of ‘the way democracy works’ at 34 per cent, compared
to an average of around 55 per cent for the other three regions. This interesting
finding suggests that popular disaffection with modern democracy in Papua
New Guinea is most evident in the region dominated by key institutions of
the state, and capital city. This may itself be a reflection of the numerical dom-
ination of parliament by the more highly populated Highlands region.
In Vanuatu, Francophone respondents (60 per cent) reported significantly
lower levels of pride in Vanuatu’s ‘fair and equal treatment of all groups in
Figure 3. Tertiary students’ pride in the way democracy works.
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society’ than did Anglophone students (76 per cent), perhaps indicating a
degree of discontent over perceived advantages enjoyed by Anglophone speak-
ers in the education and employment sectors. As Van Trease (1987) notes, the
relative lack of tertiary opportunities for Francophones within Vanuatu is in
large part an institutional legacy of French colonial educational policies,
rather than simply being a product of post-independence policy decisions.
Nonetheless, it is likely at this point that Francophones feel some resentment
at the lack of comparable tertiary education opportunities inside Vanuatu.
In Solomon Islands some significant regional differences in the responses to
national pride questions were evident. For example, students from Malaita were
more likely to feel ‘very proud’ of democracy than the rest of the respondent
group (45 vs. 31 per cent), and of the ‘fair and equal treatment of all groups
in society’ (50 vs. 36 per cent),13 findings that are likely to reflect perceptions
that Malaitans enjoy a higher level of representation of in government and
bureaucracy.
There was also a significant gender disparity in responses to national pride
questions in some countries. In Papua New Guinea, for example, female stu-
dents were significantly less proud of Papua New Guinea’s ‘fair and equal treat-
ment of all groups in society’ (39 per cent), relative to male respondents (47 per
cent). This is perhaps unsurprising, considering the subordinate role of women
in Papua New Guinea society and politics, in both traditional and modern
realms. Apart from alarmingly high levels of gender-based violence, women
also face discrimination at nearly all levels of political and social life
(AusAID, 2008).14
Maintenance of cultural identities
Another aspect of understanding national identity lies in the profound and con-
tinuing importance of local cultures. As demonstrated in Table 5, while culture
was found to be a key object of national pride in all four countries, the very idea
of culture nonetheless remains firmly associated with local, rather than national
communities, with a majority of respondents in each country (albeit with a sig-
nificantly smaller one in Timor-Leste) agreeing with the statement that it is
better if groups ‘maintain their distinct languages, customs and traditions’,
rather than ‘adapt and blend into one society’. Reflecting a view widely
noted in the qualitative literature, particularly in relation to Papua New
Guinea, the findings suggest the theme of culture is a popular one for
leaders, but mixed in its impact, with a tendency to reinforce the integrity of
local cultures rather than necessarily promote a nation-building agenda.
While this pattern does not preclude a ‘unity in diversity’ model of cultural
nationalism, the failure to incorporate highly resilient local political commu-
nities at the level of formal governance structures may lead to other
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dysfunctions in nation-building. As Jacobsen (1997, p. 242) argues, cultural
‘pluralism without representation’ may lead to communities becoming
‘elusive, inward looking and disaffected’, or to the creation of a range of infor-
mal ‘institutional hybrids’ which may undermine nation-building.
Rural–urban migration
Respondents were also asked two questions related to the key issue of rural–
urban migration: whether ‘people moving to the cities and towns causes
social problems’, and whether ‘people should stay in the area of the country
where they grew up’. As is evident in Table 6, these questions drew strong
responses indicating a depth of feeling around the issue of rural/urban
migration.
Papua New Guinea drew the strongest response to the first question, with a
startling figure of 92 per cent of student respondents agreeing with the state-
ment that ‘people moving to cities and towns causes social problems’. The
population of peri-urban settlements has progressively grown from some 25
per cent of the population of Port Moresby in 1979 to nearly half by 2001
(Koczberski et al., 2001), with a subsequent unofficial estimate placing the
figure as high as two-thirds (Squires, 2004). Migrant squatter settlements in
Table 6. Views on rural–urban migration (% answering ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’).
PNG
Solomon
Islands Vanuatu
Timor-
Leste
People moving to the cities and towns
causes social problems
92 88 88 71
People should stay in the area in
which they grew up
56.5 68 51.5 50.5
Table 5. Some people say that it is better for a nation if different ethnic groups
maintain their distinct languages, customs and traditions.
View PNG Solomon Islands Vanuatu
Timor-
Leste
It is better if groups maintain
their distinct languages,
customs and traditions
71.5 82.8 86.0 62.4
It is better if these groups
adapt and blend into one society
28.5 17.2 14.0 37.6
Notes: Others say it is better if these groups adapt and blend into one society. Which of these views
is closest to your own? (percentage of respondents).
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the major towns are commonly seen as a major source of crime, although some
authors (e.g. Goddard, 2005) challenge the validity of this claim. Certainly, a
number of these settlements in Port Moresby are regarded as ‘no go’ areas
for the public and even the police. Accurately or otherwise, many locals
blame the migrants from predominantly Highland areas for the growth in
crime rates, especially the rise of raskol groups.15 Despite this finding,
support for the statement that ‘people should stay in the area in which they
grew up’, was far weaker among Papua New Guinea tertiary students (56.5
per cent), suggesting that while respondents may view these as serious pro-
blems, they regard freedom of movement as a prevailing liberty for citizens,
particularly in their search for employment or education.
In Solomon Islands, reflecting the recent and prolonged history of conflict
in Honiara, some 88 per cent of respondents ‘strongly agreed’ (48.5 per cent) or
‘agreed’ (39.5 per cent) that ‘people moving to the cities causes social pro-
blems’; a finding which likely reflects perceptions within Honiara specifically
of increased overcrowding, growing numbers of disenfranchised young people
and increased unemployment and crime rates. Indeed, the disaggregated
response rate for Guadalcanal students alone was 96 per cent, the highest of
any province. By contrast, support for the statement, ‘people should stay in
the area in which they grew up’ was again weaker at 68 per cent, again
suggesting that fewer consider it acceptable to restrict freedom of movement
for Solomon Islanders. This figure was nonetheless the highest of the four
countries, highlighting the continuing potential for tensions within Honiara.
Indeed, the disaggregated figure for students from Guadalcanal was again the
highest, with 88 per cent agreeing that ‘people should stay in the areas of
Solomon Islands where they grew up’, compared with 65 per cent for the
rest of the respondent group.
Vanuatu has also had its share of tensions arising from rural migration to
Port Vila, as uneven development and the lure of jobs has resulted in a
steady stream of rural migrants to the capital city. According to one report
(Chung & Hill, 2002), Port Vila has trebled in size since the 1980s, growing
an average 4 per cent per year, almost twice as fast as the rural population.
The increase in the urban population living in informal housing or settlements
has grown even faster. A conflict in one such settlement, known as ‘Black
Sands’, between islanders from Tanna and Ambrym was the centre of the con-
flict that led to the declaration of a state of emergency in 2007. An attendant rise
in crime levels has led to numerous calls for restrictions on movements to the
capital and even deportation of criminals back to their islands (Wirrick, 2008).
Nonetheless, while tertiary students agreed that internal migration these
were a significant problem (88 per cent, with 47 per cent ‘strongly agree’),
respondents were significantly less likely to agree with the second proposition
(51 per cent).
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While the overall level of support for these two statements was consider-
ably lower in Timor-Leste, the issue of rural–urban migration has been no
less contentious there. The population of Timor-Leste’s capital Dili has more
than doubled in the decade since independence, from 100,715 in 1999
(Neupert & Lopes, 2006) to 241,331 in 2010 (Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste, 2010) with at least half of this population growth due to rural–
urban migration. Much of this internal migration has been concentrated in
already overcrowded areas of Dili containing former Indonesian civil service
and military housing. Competition over access to jobs and scarce resources
such as water and land has led to growing tensions and resentment of post-
1999 new arrivals. This was a key source of the 2006–2007 conflict and
remains so, with concentrated migrant populations in the west of the city cur-
rently experiencing low-level conflict.
Disaggregating the Timor-Leste results by region of origin casts light on the
nature of these continuing tensions. In Timor-Leste, the ‘east’ is generally
understood to comprise the three easternmost districts of Baucau, Viqueque
and Lautem, and the ‘west’ the 10 remaining districts, although these notions
of east and west are highly contested and based more on historical than cultural
or ethnic differences. After independence, conflicts between senior army offi-
cers from the eastern districts (where the former FALINTIL guerrilla resistance
proved more sustainable) and more junior recruits from the western districts
were further complicated by tensions between the army and the police force,
which had a significant number of members who had previously served in
the Indonesian police. When open fighting broke out within and between the
security forces in April 2006, popular resentments associated with the urban
politics of Dili were also catalysed. The Mambae, from the central western
highlands, are the dominant ethno-linguistic group and regard Dili as histori-
cally part of their territory. Easterners, particularly the Makassae ethno-linguis-
tic group, are often seen as interlopers in the capital, and are frequently referred
to as outsiders or newcomers, even by newly arrived westerners. Throughout
the political-military crisis of 2006, this viewpoint was used as a justification
for the eviction of thousands of easterners from their homes. In 2010, some
four years after the so called ‘East–West’ crisis, a region of origin breakdown
of this question found that 35 per cent of students from western districts
strongly agreed with the proposition that ‘people moving to the cities cause
social problems’, compared with just 27 per cent of easterners. On the
second question, the difference was comparable with 28.5 per cent of wester-
ners strongly agreeing that ‘people should stay in the area where they grew
up’, compared with just 19 per cent of easterners. These findings suggest
ongoing perceptions among some Dili residents from western districts that
the national capital is located in the ‘west’, giving easterners less legitimate
claims to ownership of potentially contested urban areas.
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 469
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [2
20
.2
37
.1
01
.5
0]
 a
t 2
3:
25
 2
4 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
3 
Preferences for agents of dispute resolution
A further set of questions surveyed student preferences for agents of dispute
resolution in differing scenarios. The ongoing importance of both traditional
and modern understandings of political community was evident in student
responses, which varied between traditional and modern domains, depending
on the nature of the conflict. Reflecting the customary nature of land tenure
in all four countries, responses to the question ‘who should resolve disputes
over land?’ revealed that, with the exception of Timor-Leste, substantial
majorities favoured traditional authorities and elders (Papua New Guinea 59
per cent, Solomon Islands 70 per cent, Vanuatu 71 per cent), with the alterna-
tive options (national government, local/district/province government, or the
churches) receiving the balance of preferences. In Timor-Leste, the trend was
reversed, with just 28 per cent expressing a preference for traditional authorities
to settle land disputes, and 58 per cent expressing a preference for the national
government. This finding reflects the complicated overlay of successive tra-
ditional, Portuguese and Indonesian land titles that have been an ongoing
source of conflict since independence – particularly within Dili – and the
intractability of a number of long running rural land disputes, resulting in
part from mass dislocation during the Indonesian occupation, which traditional
authorities have failed to resolve.
In the case of ‘disputes between neighbours’, student responses were dis-
tinct, with preferences for traditional authorities higher than for the previous
question in Timor-Leste (47 per cent), but notably lower in Melanesia
(Papua New Guinea 40 per cent, Solomon Islands 45 per cent, Vanuatu 58
per cent), where a preference for national police also emerged as significant
(Papua New Guinea 45 per cent, Solomon Islands 30 per cent, Vanuatu 28
per cent). In Timor-Leste student preferences for national police to be the
agents of resolving ‘disputes between neighbours’ was a mere 11.5 per cent,
demonstrating the continuing strength of traditional authority, outside the par-
ticularly contentious issue of land ownership. By contrast, the findings indicate
that land-related disputes remain the domain of customary law in Melanesia.
Smaller minorities favoured the church as the preferred agent of resolving dis-
putes between neighbours, with support highest in Solomon Islands (20 per
cent), reflecting the positive mediation role played by the church there
during the crisis period.16
Two further questions sought responses to ‘crimes against property’ and
‘crimes against the person’, from the options of national police, traditional
authorities, the church and (in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste only) inter-
national police. All four countries exhibited strong preferences for national
police to deal with crimes, which clearly highlight student perceptions of the
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perceived boundaries between traditional and modern authority. Of most inter-
est were responses relating to the two countries with international policing
forces. Notably, while student preferences for international police were com-
paratively low, they were significantly stronger in relation to ‘crimes against
the person’ (Solomon Islands 19 per cent, Timor-Leste 17 per cent) than for
‘crimes against property’ (Solomon Islands 5 per cent, Timor-Leste 10 per
cent) – findings which may be useful in guiding the nature of international
withdrawal from the latter mission, or assessing the impact of the former.
While UN police have now handed over control to the national police in
Timor-Leste, this process most recently occurred in Dili, which is seen as the
most volatile area. There remain serious concerns over the national police
force’s ability to control violence in the capital city, and east–west divisions
still provide a source of ongoing tension within the police force in Dili
(Wilson, 2013). Analogous concerns over the perceived dominance of police
by Malaitans were evident in pre-RAMSI Solomon Islands. The 2007
‘Peoples Survey’ found that as many as 65 per cent of people thought that con-
flict would return if RAMSI left (ANU Enterprise Pty Ltd, 2010). Overall, these
findings clearly suggest the formal idea of ‘crimes’ against individuals is firmly
associated with the modern state and legal system, where more traditional
domains are considered the appropriate means of negotiating collective
issues that affect and disrupt kinship groups.
Gender breakdown: preferences for dispute resolution
These findings also revealed significant gender differences in preferences for
dispute resolution, particularly in relation to the role of traditional authorities
and elders. For example, in Solomon Islands, where 73 per cent of male respon-
dents indicated a preference for traditional authorities to address disputes over
land, the equivalent figure for female respondents was appreciably lower at 62
per cent. Similarly, in Timor-Leste, female students also expressed significantly
lower preferences for traditional authorities to resolve land disputes (33 per cent
male, 21 per cent female), and ‘disputes between neighbours’ (52 per cent male,
41 per cent female). These findings highlight the way educated female students
are more likely than male counterparts to question the male domination of tra-
ditional authority in the villages, and reflect the lack of adequate female partici-
pation and representation in local and traditional decision-making processes
(Wallace, 2000).
Conclusion
Nation-building in Melanesia and Timor-Leste continues to pose considerable
challenges for post-independence political elites. While this study reveals a
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number of unifying understandings of national identity with broad support
among likely future elites, it also highlights key areas in which region of
origin, gender, or language of education continue to inform divergent and com-
peting visions of nation, identity and political community.
This study’s findings highlight several important policy challenges with
implications for nation builders in Melanesia and Timor-Leste. Data across
all four sites demonstrated that traditional belief systems, processes and struc-
tures are held in parallel with contemporary beliefs such as Christianity and
democratic principles such as the rule of law, indicating a need for the devel-
opment of hybrid systems of governance, particularly at local levels. This
finding is particularly significant in that the survey group is among the most
urbanised, educated, and ethnically heterogeneous groups in these four
societies. The study also found high degrees of national pride, and faith in
democratic principles; but conversely, low levels of pride in contemporary
democratic performance and inter-group tolerance. In combination with
strong feelings over the issue of rural–urban migration, such responses consti-
tute both a symptom of uneven development and a marker of regional or lin-
guistic faultlines that still pose a challenge to the development of a durable
sense of ‘national’ political community.
These findings also have implications for international partners seeking to
assist domestic nation-building agendas in these four nations. These include the
need to address regional and ethno-linguistic balance in development
assistance, engaging non-state actors in the development process, supporting
education, expanding media development, and improving gender equity.
Regional and ethno-linguistic balance
The findings suggest that future development policies should be sensitive to
regional differences and fracture lines in emerging states, and ensure regional
and ethno-linguistic balance in all development strategies and education
initiatives. The support of national governments in ensuring demographically
representative selection of candidates for teaching and civil service employ-
ment, to minimise resentment over perceptions of regional or ethno-linguistic
bias is of high importance. As has been evident in recent conflicts in all four
case study countries, it is also important to assist national governments in
quickly responding to regional tensions, as they have the potential to
become national conflicts.
Non-state actors
The findings also suggest that international partners and donors should examine
ways they can support and enhance the role of non-state sectors (such as
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organised religions and local non-government organisations) in aid and devel-
opment programme delivery. Utilising traditional leaders and non-state actors
in conflict resolution mechanisms initiated by national governments may also
reduce ethnic or other regional tensions. Acknowledging and incorporating
the role of traditional authorities and customary law in dispute resolution,
and in judicial system reform and policing strategies, may likewise assist and
support the processes of nation-building.
Education
Teaching national languages in primary and secondary education systems is
central to nation-building agendas. National governments should also be sup-
ported to incorporate civic education modules in school curriculum develop-
ment that focus on issues of national identity more explicitly, and apply
language standards at all levels of education. International donors and partners
can support in the translation of these resources in multi-language environ-
ments, as has occurred in Vanuatu in recent years. National governments
should also encourage inter-language group mixing in key selective regional
or national secondary schools, with supporting scholarship and boarding pro-
grammes, to support the development of a national perspective among future
elites. Demographically representative selection for university admission in
capital cities, and to foreign scholarship programmes, to ensure a broad
regional cross section is represented in future national elites, will also help
foster a nationally oriented group of future leaders, and minimise the risk of
regionalised tensions.
Media
Improved and expanded media and communications infrastructure is an effec-
tive opportunity to ‘bridge the physical and social distance that often separates
and isolates people in large and geographically fragmented countries’ (Dinnen,
2007, p. 4). To help foster a sense of national political community, national
governments should be supported to develop accessible, affordable and
quality national telecommunications, focussing on radio in particular. National
media (especially radio and television) can also be developed and utilised as a
key support for nation building through national programming on arts, culture
and sport.
Gender equity
The role of women in local and national government could be strengthened
through the use of quota systems and leadership training programmes to
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assist the process of nation building and the development of a representative
and inclusive sense of national identity. This is a particular priority in Melane-
sia, where women’s representation in politics has been very low, and where
women often have a limited role in traditional decision-making processes, as
the findings of this study further highlight. This could in part be achieved
through utilising the media, especially radio, to enhance the image and role
of women in each of these societies and address gender inequalities.
∗∗∗
While these three Melanesian nations and Timor-Leste have relatively young
states, they have longstanding and durable cultures and traditions that bring
great social resilience, even as they appear at times to conflict with the trans-
communal logic of the modern nation-state, and liberal ideas of citizenship
equality. While they may therefore be considered ‘fragile’ by these criteria,
any response to understanding nation-building and the formation of national
identity in these states must respect the strengths, while recognising the weak-
nesses, of both the new and the old orders. Like all nations, the development of
a national identity in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Timor-
Leste is a continuing process in evolution, rather than a simple by-product of
political independence. Understanding the attitudes to national identity of
likely future leaders in these countries offers useful insights into how these con-
tinuing processes may develop over coming years.
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Notes
1. Rae (2002), for example, identifies earlier incarnations of ‘nation-building’
agendas in forms of ‘pathological homogenisation’ aimed at creating a unified
national population in postcolonial Africa and Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. As
Berger (2006, p. 6) notes, the terms nation-building and state-building have
been used, often interchangeably, in a diversity of situations including ‘formal
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military occupation, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, national reconstruction,
foreign aid and the use of stabilisation forces under the auspices of the USA,
Britain, France, NATO, the UN or another international or regional organization’.
2. Since the 1940s Maasina Rule movement Malaitans have also made continuing
calls for political autonomy, devolution or even secession.
3. This conflict was largely contained to Guadalcanal and Malaita, with some over-
flow to the western Solomons.
4. In 2004, the percentage of the population under 14 years of age was estimated at
39 per cent in PNG, 42 per cent in Solomon Islands, 34 per cent in Vanuatu and 38
per cent in Timor-Leste (AusAID, 2006).
5. Median age in the Pacific is 21 years, compared, for example, with 35.5 years in
Australia (Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2006).
6. Hela and Jiwaka are two new provinces that will be created in Papua New Guinea
in 2012 (from the existing Southern and Western Highlands provinces). A large
liquefied natural gas project is being constructed in Hela and is leading to conflict
over land and royalty payments.
7. The breakdown of survey respondents by nation was as follows: PNG (308),
Solomon Islands (190), Vanuatu (298) and Timor-Leste (365). The Vanuatu
survey comprised 201 Anglophone and 97 Francophone students.
8. Hiri Motu is also an official language of Papua New Guinea and a lingua franca in
parts of the Papua region, though its use has declined in recent years.
9. It is perhaps noteworthy that each of these regions has a greater population than
any other Melanesian state.
10. Using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) crosstab analysis, Pear-
son’s chi-squared test established significance of the correlation at 0.02 (where 5
per cent is a statistically significant correlation). An average 70 per cent from the
three other regions reported feeling ‘very close’ to Papua New Guinea, compared
with 56.5 per cent from the Islands region. Chi-square tests indicate the signifi-
cance of association between qualitative variables.
11. These disparities were even larger for reports of feeling ‘very close’ to one’s
village: Papua New Guinea 69 per cent men, 57 per cent women; Solomon
Islands 64 per cent men, 51 per cent women.
12. In East Timor during the Indonesian occupation, the Catholic Church’s decision
to use Tetum rather than Indonesian in services reinforced the language’s status
as a lingua franca in parts of East Timor, facilitating its emergence as a dis-
tinctly ‘national’ language and expression of national identity. At the same
time, the role of the Church as a unifying forum for expressing the common
suffering of various ethnic and language groups in East Timor greatly increased
its popularity, and to some degree made Catholicism itself a salient expression
of national identity during the occupation. At the same time, as Anderson
(1993) notes, the Indonesian state requires citizens to affiliate to one of the
five official religions. Thus, while mistrusting the spread of Catholicism in
East Timor – particularly as the local Church remained staunchly independent
of the Indonesian Catholic hierarchy – the logic of the state also demanded it.
In 1975, it is estimated that little more than 30 per cent of East Timorese ident-
ified as Catholic – a figure which had almost trebled by 1999. Reflecting these
nation-building roles, the Catholic Church receives a special mention in the
new constitution, valorised by the State for its ‘participation ... in the
process of national liberation of East Timor’ (s11.2) (see Anderson, 1993;
Leach 2003).
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13. Total levels of pride showed a narrower difference in relation to pride in democ-
racy (70 vs. 65 per cent), but remained stark in relation to pride in the fair treat-
ment of all groups (79 vs. 69 per cent)
14. One female focus group respondent (Focus Group, 2009) noted, ‘Although there
are some regional variations, in my culture, women can’t speak at public func-
tions and gatherings’. As the 2006 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women report on Papua New Guinea states, ‘Women in PNG do
not enjoy equality in relation to the ownership, administration, enjoyment
and disposition of property since land tenure is based on custom, leaving
men in control of many aspects of land and property’ (Jivan & Forster 2007,
p. 282).
15. ‘Raskol’ is a Tok Pisin word (derived from ‘rascal’) used in PNG to refer to street
gangs in urban PNG, linked with new squatter settlements on the urban periphery,
and frequently involved in criminal activities ranging from the opportunistic rob-
beries and assaults, to organised racketeering.
16. The relatively high preference for church mediation of disputes in the Solomon
Islands may also reflect the active opposition of some churches to local practices
of compensation payments, which they associate negatively with kastom.
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